The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is an international agreement concluded on 14 July 2015 between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the group of six world powers (China, France, Russia, the UK, the US, and Germany) plus the European Union.
It aimed to limit Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for relief from certain economic sanctions.
Under the accord, Iran committed to a series of nuclear-related restrictions and oversight measures, while the participating states pledged to lift or suspend specified sanctions conditional on compliance.
The agreement, once adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency and endorsed through United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, forms a central part of global non-proliferation architecture.
The JCPOA represents a complex diplomatic compromise: Iran accepted limits on uranium enrichment, reductions in its centrifuge programme, conversion of certain facilities, and enhanced monitoring, all in return for sanction relief, reintegration into the global economy, and access to civil nuclear cooperation.
The agreement set time-bound commitments (often ten to fifteen years), introduced “breakout” time safeguards, and required the IAEA to inspect Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
At the same time, sanctions-related commitments from participating states (including the United States and the European Union) were structured to phase out or suspend if Iran met its obligations.
Although widely heralded as historic at its inception, the agreement also faced criticism and operational challenges.
Some parties questioned the enforceability of its terms, the ability of the IAEA to verify undeclared activities, and the durability of the sanctions relief given Iran’s broader regional behaviour.
Over time, the dynamic shifted: In 2018, the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and re-imposed sanctions; Iran subsequently scaled back its compliance in steps; and efforts to revive or renegotiate the deal remained ongoing as geopolitical conditions evolved.
In the context of non-proliferation and sanctions compliance, the JCPOA occupies several key intersections:
The agreement can be analysed into several interlocking components:
The IAEA confirmed Iran’s key nuclear steps, and sanctions relief commenced for nuclear-related restrictions.
The United States announced its exit from the deal and reintroduced unilateral sanctions; other parties remained formally in the agreement.
Iran gradually reduced its adherence, exceeding enrichment levels, installing advanced centrifuges, and limiting IAEA access, citing US “maximum-pressure” measures.
Diplomacy resumed to restore or revise the deal; discussions touched on extended restrictions, enforcement guarantees, and financial mechanisms.
The JCPOA was the first time a developing nation’s enrichment programme was formally recognised under a multilateral agreement and linked to sanctions relief.
It set a precedent for negotiation, verification, and phased-in commitments.
Financial institutions operating with or providing services to Iran faced a complex regulatory environment.
Even with sanctions relief, many banks remained cautious due to ongoing risks, US secondary sanctions, and legacy exposure.
The deal’s implementation required enhanced due diligence, screening for counterparties, risk-based segmentation, and monitoring of Iranian financial flows.
The deal influenced Middle-East power balances, global oil markets, and relations between Iran and the West.
The evolving status of the JCPOA affected perceptions of Iran’s regional role, its economic reintegration, and the design of sanctions-related risk frameworks.
Entities dealing with Iran or Iranian entities must assess heightened risks:
Critics argue that the deal’s phased approach and “sunset” clauses create risk when restrictions cease to apply.
The effectiveness of the IAEA’s inspection regime in detecting covert activities has also been subject to debate.
Despite relief, banks remained wary of secondary sanctions exposure (especially US jurisdiction), leading to “de-risking” of Iran-related clients and reduced financial access for Iran.
The agreement did not directly address Iran’s missile programme, regional proxies, or human-rights record, which remained key concerns for stakeholders like Israel and Saudi Arabia.
The withdrawal of the US demonstrated the fragility of the deal’s backing.
The possibility of a return to full sanctions exposes counterparties to rapid shifts in risk profiles.
From a financial crime perspective, cross-border flows, correspondent banking relationships, and trade-finance mechanisms involving Iran require heightened due diligence and monitoring for illicit trafficking, sanctions evasion, and proliferation financing.
Move at crypto speed without losing sight of your regulatory obligations.
With IDYC360, you can scale securely, onboard instantly, and monitor risk in real time—without the friction.